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In this paper I focus on one of the most peculiar features of the Italian labour market: the
importance played by recommendations in the hiring of new personnel. It is usually argued
that, in contrast with the experience of other industrialized countries, in Italy letters of
reference are not used to signal job applicants' qualities, but only to obtain a favoured
treatment in the hiring process. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms have used those
practices both to overcome rigid hiring regulation and to weaken unions' power. In the
empirical analysis, conducted on data drawn from the 1991 Bank of Italy Survey of
Household Income and Wealth, I show that while workers seeking through
recommendations increase the chance of being hired, they also pay a ''recommendation fee''
vis-a-vis workers hired through more traditional mechanisms. I provide various
explanations for these results.
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1. Introduction
This paper is an attempt to shed light on one of the most peculiar features
of the Italian labour market: the role and importance of recommendations.
2
Based on data drawn from the 1991 Bank of Italy Survey of Household
Income and Wealth, a representative survey of the Italian population, we
show that recommendations are widely used as a device to access the labour
market. For instance, more then 40 per cent of workers report to have
obtained their current job through a recommendation; moreover, one
unemployed or first-job-seeker in three reports to be currently seeking a job
by checking with relatives and friends rather than relying on public
employment agencies or other formal job search mechanisms. We also
report evidence showing that it is more likely to be hired when using a
recommendation than when using any other job search strategy.
Yet, obtaining a favoured treatment in the process of hiring does not
come without costs: we show that while recommendations do increase the
probability of receiving job offers, they also generate a sizeable pecuniary
loss. In a regression of annual earnings onto human capital variables and a
dummy for whether the worker was hired through a recommendation, the
latter displays a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This
finding appears robust to various changes in specification.
The evidence above can be reconciled with different stories related to the
functioning of the Italian labour market, the most convincing one being that
both firms and workers may found convenient to hire and to be hired
through recommendations. On one hand, firms might have used the practice
of hiring through recommendations to overcome rigid labour market
regulation, weaken union bargaining power and reducing hiring costs; on
the other hand, seeking work through recommendations might be
2 In what follows, I assume that a worker is hired through a recommendation if she obtained her job
as a consequence of a signalling process made by relatives, friends or acquaintances to the
potential employer. The hiring of recommended workers is seen as an unpleasent feature of the
labour market because workers' merits are valued less than letters of references.3
convenient for workers too, as it entails less pecuniary and time search-
related costs and seems more successful in terms of job offers.
3
A possible argument against the existence of the trade-off mentioned
above is that in equilibrium all workers will choose to be judged according
to their merits rather than on the basis of recommendations (in particular, if
the present discounted value of the income loss exceeds that related to the
delayed entry in the labour market). However, people may still prefer
seeking work through recommendations if the competition amongst job
seekers is fierce, an effect that is particularly strong in a country where
youth and long-term unemployment rates are well above European
standards and where individuals display clear preferences for job security
and earnings stability.
As an interpretation of our results, we argue that low pay and
recommendations might be related simply because the dummy for
recommendation picks up the effect of unobservable low skills and ability;
in other words, had we available a consistent measure for unobservable
skills, the negative effect of recommendations on wages would probably
disappear.
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 anecdotal
evidence is summarized and some extensions are considered; in section 3
we analyse the data used in the empirical part; section 4 deals with a
discussion of the results; section 5 concludes. An Appendix details labour
hiring regulations in Italy.
3  This is also argued by Holtzer (1988). Seeking work through recommendation is less
time consuming as individuals rely on friends, relatives and acquaintances' help, rather
than committing themselves to an active job search. Recommendations might also be
cheaper than, say, relying on a ''head-hunter'' agency because no fee is paid to the friend,
relative or acquaintance who provided the job.
4  Alternatively, one should estimate a fixed effect model for earnings at times t and t+1.
For identification purposes, the sample should include individuals who changed their
job between t and t+1 and who obtained the first job with a recommendation and the
second without (or vice versa).4
2. Recommendations in the Italian labour market
I first need to explain the importance played by recommendations in the
Italian labour market. In contrast with the experience of other industrialized
countries, where letters of recommendations are used by firms as a signal
for the high quality of a job applicant,
5  in Italy letters of reference may well
not signal any worker's characteristics at all, being just a way to obtain a
favoured treatment in the process of hiring.
6
In general, informal (or even illicit) practices arise when markets do not
function according to the walrasian paradigm: for instance, when credit
markets are imperfect usury and pawnbroking proliferate. A similar
argument applies to the labour market as well. Given the available job
opportunities and workers' characteristics, a perfect labour market would
allocate individuals to available jobs according to a ''matching'' mechanism.
In other words, in a labour market with complete and frictionless
information, letters of references (or recommendations) should play no role.
A worker would be hired according to observable characteristics (for
instance, human capital factors such as labour market experience, education,
etc.) and the firm would always be able to obtain reliable information about
workers' prospective productivity. Thus, we argue, recommendations may
only arise as one of the possible outcomes of labour market imperfections or
asymmetric information.
7
5  An obvious example is given by the academic job market (or also by the process of
application for a Ph.D. in a prestigious University). To lower levels of the occupational
scale, letters of reference provided by previous employers may be useful to ascertain
workers' quality and other characteristics (such as loyalty to the firm, committment to
overtime work, etc.).
6  One might argue that in the absence of reliable data this argument is at best debatable,
or that recommendations are not necessarily bad in all circumstance. Given that
recommendations usually represented a violation of hiring regulations (see the
Appendix), data on this issue are obviously lacking. The only source of evidence we can
rely on is of forensic or anecdotal nature, and it is on latter that the argument above is
based.
7  Other unpleasant features of the Italian labour market are often empirically neglected.
This is mainly due to lack of reliable data. For instance, very little is known about the
extension and the functioning of the underground labour market (allegedly involving
some 4 millions workers in 1995).5
One such imperfection was probably the tight constraint imposed by the
regulation on hiring and firing in force until 1991. In some circumstances,
firms had no decisional power whatsoever in the process of hiring of new
personnel. When recruiting was needed, they were to submit a request to the
local public employment agency (Ufficio di Collocamento); workers were
then allocated to the firm according to a pure ranking criterion, irrespective
of skills. It is therefore not surprising that firms tried to overcome hiring
regulations by relying on informal (actually, illicit) practices such as
recommendations. Since job vacancies could not be publicly advertised,
direct contacts with the work force or intermediaries were used, thus
creating a self-sustaining development for recommendations.
Recommended workers might simply be more informed than other job-
seekers about job vacancies and wage offers (this is particularly the case in
small labour markets). Alternatively, they might overpower non
recommended workers of similar (or even higher) abilities and skills by
exploiting the strength of a recommendation. This raises the problem of
knowing how much a recommendation costs, and whether a formal price is
in fact posted. Unfortunately, to draw such knowledge there is no other
possibility than relying on anecdotal evidence or common presumptions.
In some cases, individuals bequeath the job to their child by renouncing
to some end-of-career compensation (such as the liquidazione);
8 the firm
only requires the \textit{heir} to possess a minimum level of education
needed to access the post. Very little is known about the legitimacy of such
practice. In other cases, the employer is a friend or a relative's friend; the
reference may even be costless in this case, and it is hard to oppose legal
exceptions (unless a job allocation scheme needs to be fulfilled, such as the
one imposed by the chiamata numerica regulation, see the Appendix).
Finally, a reference might be paid a market price; the price is probably
higher as safer or better-paid is the targeted job. The price has not
necessarily a monetary equivalent; for instance, prospective Members of
Parliament may promise a job (or their commitment to help or signal)
against a given number of votes provided by the buyer.
9 More frequently,
8  The practice seems to be still in force, especially in the banking sector.
9  Forensic evidence shows that this has often occurred (the most famous cases probably
being those of the Mayor of Naples Achille Lauro in the 1950s, and MP Angelo Vito,
the one-million-votes-man in the General Elections of 1987). The latter was convicted6
the reference is obtained via a monetary payment. There is probably an
explicit agreement (and a sharing of the price paid by the buyer) between
the seller and the firm's representative (the owner, an influential
shareholder, a member of the CEO, etc.). It is clear that this practice is
illicit, although it can be very difficult to detect.
10
3.  The data
This section briefly describes the construction of our sample. We use the
1991 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (hereafter, SHIW) conducted
by the Central Bank of Italy in March-May 1992. The SHIW is widely used
in empirical work since it contains information on income, consumption,
wealth, household characteristics, and individual labour supply. For more
details about the survey, the interested reader is referred to Brandolini and
Cannari (1994).
For each survey, a sample of about 8,000 households is interviewed. The
survey is conducted in the first quarter of the following year and all the
variables refer to the previous calendar year. The unit of observation is the
de facto household, which includes all persons residing in the same dwelling
and who are related by blood, marriage, affection, or adoption. Households
are randomly selected through a two-stages-stratified sampling procedure,
and the design of the survey is such that the final sample is representative of
the Italian population. Since 1989, the survey also contains a small panel
component.
for having promised employment opportunities to his potential voters against votes. The
''clean hands'' investigation has shown that the practice was widely used as a mechanism
to obtain votes at general or administrative elections. The phenomenon at issue has been
known as the ''exchange vote''. Commentators refer to the sharp increase in public sector
employment occurred in the 1970s and 1980s to give further strenght to this argument.
10 Recommendations are not a peculiar characteristic of the labour market, though. Italians
seem to be particularly prone to use recommendations almost in any aspect of their
social life. Popular press has often reported scandals of people recommended even to
obtain their school licence or to get a pass at university exams. Recommendations are
also used to avoid the compulsory military service. Very recently, the public manager of
the state-owned Railways company admitted the presence in his company of personnel
hired through recommendations.7
Since entrepreneurship does not require a formal hiring process, we
exclude the self-employed and focus only on household heads working full-
time in the public or private sector. The original data set included 3,509
such individuals. For obvious reasons, we decided to exclude those working
in the public sector (1,393 observations). This due to the fact that, at least in
principle, jobs in the public sector can only be obtained by competition, not
by recommendation; however, there is some evidence that this legal
requirement has been violated quite regularly, and our data actually confirm
such disappointing evidence.
11
We also exclude individuals aged above 65 or below 20 (6 observations),
those working in agriculture (123 observations) and those with missing
values on the variables we use in the empirical section (56 observations).
Finally, to avoid our estimates to be contaminated by influential values or
measurement errors, we trim the sample at the bottom and top 1 per cent of
the distribution of earnings (37 observations). The final sample used in this
study includes 1,894 individuals.
The 1991 SHIW contains a special section (section B9 of the
questionnaire) collecting information on job mobility and job search. The
survey question we use to discriminate between recommended and non-
recommended workers is the following:
''How did you get your current job? (Please provide just one answer)''.
Possible answers are:
i)  through a public employment agency (Ufficio di Collocamento);
ii) through an open competition in the public administration or other
public institution;
iii) replying to a job advertisement published on a newspaper/magazine;
iv) sending a CV to a potential employer;
v) through a ''head-hunter'' agency (without replying to any
advertisement);
vi) through signalling made by friends, relatives or acquaintances to a
potential employer;
11 Ironically enough, 187 out of 1393 people working in the public administration naively
admitted to have been hired through references.8
vii) inserting CV in a data-bank;
viii)helping a relative in his/her job;
ix) becoming self-employed;
x) receiving a direct job offer by a firm;
xi) other.
For the purpose at hand, individuals choosing option vi) are labelled as
`'recommended''; individuals choosing any other option are instead labelled
as ''non-recommended''. Table 1 shows that 47 per cent of individuals in our
sample obtained their current job through a recommendation. This is a
striking figure, in particular if one considers the tight regulation on hiring
procedures in force in Italy until 1991 (see Appendix).
People interviewed in the 1991 SHIW are also asked to report how they
are seeking work (if any). Possible options are again i) to xi) as in the
question above, but up to three different answers are allowed. For the sub-
sample of currently unemployed job seekers, we find that seeking work
through recommendation is not the preferred first option (it is chosen by
only 10 per cent of job seekers). However, when we focus on individuals
choosing just one option, we find that seeking work through
recommendation is the preferred search strategy for roughly 32 per cent of
the sub-sample.
4  The results
Table 2 presents simple statistics for the two groups of workers we are
dealing with. As the table shows, recommended and non-recommended
workers are on average quite different. Workers hired through a
recommendation are less educated, with less labour market experience and
more likely to live in the Middle. Recommended workers are also more
likely to live in a small town (perhaps because in the local labour market
hiring regulations can be violated more easily). As far as labour market
characteristics are concerned, they work more hours,
12 but their earnings are
12 This is perhaps a symptom of the fact that some individuals in this group are actually
working in the underground economy.9
lower; the majority of them work as blue collar in the manufacturing or the
construction industry, while very few of them work as managers in the
service industry. Finally, they are more likely to have lost working days
because of illness. On average, workers who obtained their job with a
recommendation also spent less time unemployed than those who obtained
it using more traditional search strategies (3.37 vis-a-vis 3.49 years).
13
Another way to answer the same question is to use data on more than a
single year. To this aim, I construct a panel of individuals surveyed in both
1991 and 1993. There are 4242 such individuals. Of them, 598 (or 14 per
cent of the sample) reported to be unemployed in 1991 and currently
seeking work. We decided to focus our attention on this group; this is
because we are more likely to assess the effect of recommendations on
employment opportunities by looking at individuals whose initial state is
that of unemployment and whose arrival state depends on individual and
market characteristics. In other words, we can assess whether labour market
transitions are affected by recommendations.
In table 3 we show the search strategies adopted by these individuals; as
said above, while searching trough recommendations is not the most
preferred option (it is chosen by only 11 per cent of the sample), it is an
option abundantly picked up by people seeking through different channels.
Next, we examine labour market transitions between 1991 and 1993. These
are reported in table 4. The majority of the 1991 unemployed job-seeker is
still unemployed in 1993, while roughly 20 per cent of our sample make a
transition towards employment. Table 5 shows that about 40 per cent of the
latter were employed through a recommendation. From this evidence, we
are in position to confirm that recommendations do help finding a job more
easily (and perhaps more quickly) than any other job search strategy
available to the unemployed.
In table 6 we relate log-earnings to human capital variables (Willis,
1978), job characteristics, and the dummy for a recommended worker. We
present three different specifications: (1) one with labour market experience
13 This is obtained as (age-education-experience-6): it is the number of years between
school leaving age and age when firstly entrying the labour market. It is fair to say that,
due to measurement errors, it might a very poor measure of the variable of interest. This
confirms the idea that a recommendation increases the chance of finding a job and that
recommended workers obtain it earlier.10
and its square term, education, gender, region of residence and the dummy
for recommendation; (2) adding industry dummies; (3) adding occupation
dummies. In the simplest specification the dummy for recommended
workers displays a statistically significant coefficient of -0.046. Adding job
characteristics to control for industry or occupation earnings differentials
reduces the point estimate of the effect, but in the extended specification (3)
being ''favoured'' in the process of hiring still amounts to a negative
premium of about 3 per cent. At the sample means, and after controlling for
differences in human capital, demographics, and job characteristics, being
recommended amounts to the payment of an annual ''fee'' of roughly 1
million lire. In absolute value, being recommended appears to be more
costly then giving up school one year earlier. Different explanations can be
provided for this result.
First, it could reflect the low quality or low skills of individuals unable to
get a job according to market forces;
14 second, it could be related to the fact
that a portion of those hired through recommendations are probably working
in the underground economy (where of course labour market regulations are
violated by definition); third, the firm could pay low wages to workers hired
through informal or illicit practices as a sort of closed box compensation
(i.e., for the fact that they hire untested workers) or in order to be
compensated for the fact that recommended workers experiment shorter
unemployment spells that the non-recommended; fourth, as argued by
Holzen (1988), individuals who search using references provided by friends
or relatives are actually those who invest less in the search activity and then
face less search costs, so that the fact of being impatient (which is reflected
in their preferred search strategy) can lead them to accept the first job offer
they receive, which may be well a low one. A final possibility is that
workers of this type ''are not taken seriously'', i.e. that the employer forms
some belief about their (presumed low) ability; since it takes some time
14 The fact that the dummy for recommended workers is negative and statistically
significant could meet the kind of criticism raised by Di Nardo and Pischke (1997)
against Kruegers (1993) finding that the introduction of computers generated a positive
wage premium of nearly 12 per cent in the US. Di Nardo and Pischke show that this is
due to the very simple fact that the dummy for computer is proxying for unmeasured
ability characteristics, rather than representing a genuine ''causal'' relationship.
Likewise, one might argue that in our context the dummy for recommended workers is
negative and significant simply because is proxing for the low ability of those searching
and getting jobs through informal practices.11
before updating beliefs and ascertaining workers' productivity on the job,
and since salary progression is usually strictly tied to seniority rules,
recommended workers may end up being paid less than observationally
equivalent individuals because of the initial belief held by the employer.
If the first interpretation we provided is valid, our empirical results give
rise to some concern. One worry is that low quality ''recommended'' are
crowding out high quality ''non-recommended'' workers from available
employment opportunities. Due to the heavy regulation prevailing on the
Italian labour market, the inefficiency generated by hiring low quality
''recommended'' workers instead of high quality ''non-recommended''
workers tends to increase over time, as firing costs are exacerbated by the
extension of union protection and labour market seniority.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have tried to uncover the statistical relationship between
earnings and the likelihood of being hired via a recommendation provided
by relatives, friends or acquaintances. The paper is also a modest attempt to
shed light on an issue that is widely discussed in the popular press, but that
has never received attention at academic level.
When summarizing the results of this paper, one is faced with several
empirical puzzles. First, roughly half of the workers in our sample obtained
their job through a recommendation; yet, the Italian regulation on hiring
procedures dictated that ad-hoc labour hiring was to be used only in
extraordinary circumstances (see the Appendix). Second, more than 10 per
cent of those working in the public sector report to have been obtained their
job via a recommendation; yet, and by law, the access to public sector jobs
can only occur by open competition, not by recommendation. Third, being a
recommended workers amount to the payment of an annual average fee of 1
million lire vis-a-vis non-recommended workers. A possible explanation is
that being recommended signals low productivity or low skills, or else that
firms let recommended workers to pay a penalty for the favoured treatment
they grant them in the process of hiring; but if the signal is so evident, one is12
left with the puzzle of explaining why profit-maximizing firms do not use
that signal on reverse, i.e. to screen recommended workers out.
15
All these puzzles can probably be reconciled with the fact that the Italian
labour market is highly imperfect and that only in recent times seems to
have made its way towards ''crossing the river'' (Bertola and Ichino, 1995).
Whether in the future merits will be valued more than recommendations
remains an open question that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
15 The ''clean hands'' investigation has shown that in some cases private firms were
promised to win the bid for a public contract if they accepted to pay a bribe or hire
workers recommended by those in charge with the appointment.13
Appendix
Labour hiring regulations in Italy
Labour hiring procedures in Italy have been regulated by two laws: law
no. 264, passed in 1949, and law no. 223, passed in 1991. Between these
two dates, various legislative measures modified only slightly the rules of
labour hiring established in 1949. According to law no. 264, the hiring of
involuntary unemployed workers and those seeking work was to be
supervised by public employment agencies Uffici di Collocamento), with
very few exceptions (mainly in agriculture, the arts, and maritime and air
transport). Firms willing to hire new personnel were to submit a request to
the local public employment agency, which would provide them with a list
of potential employees to be hired. Those were sorted according to
qualifications and merits. This was knows as the numerical call (chiamata
numerica) criterion. Exceptions to such criterion should have been rare. In
particular, the discretionary power of firms in hiring new personnel was to
be applied only to special categories of workers: the employers relatives,
precision craft and highly skilled workers hired via an open competition,
and those hired by firms whose size was below four. The alternative
criterion to the numerical call was known as the nominative call (chiamata
nominativa). The unbearable restrictions imposed by such regime generated
high rigidity in the labour market and frequent violations of the law; firms
circumvented the legal obstacles by interpreting the legislative measures at
large. Recommendations raised in the legislative chaos. Due to such state of
play, exceptions to job allocation schemes were extended by law to
domestic workers (1973), apprentices (1987), those hired through solidarity
contract (1984), young workers hired on a temporary basis through training
contracts (contratti di formazione e lavoro) and receiving a firm offer for a
permanent position up to 32 months after the expiring of their contract
(1984), and workers with hiring priorities (e.g., those previously fired by the
firm due to demand shortage). The job allocation scheme devised as far as in
1949 was eventually abolished in 1991 by the law no. 223. According to the
latter, starting from 1989 onward (and hence retrospectively) firms willing
to hire new personnel would apply fully discretionary procedures. Bertola
and Ichino (1995) interpret the law no. 223/1991 as an important step
towards flexibility in the Italian labour market.14
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TABLE 1
HOW CURRENT JOB WAS OBTAINED





























Variable Recommended Non recommended
































































Number of observations 891 1,003
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Variables labelled with * are proportions.17
TABLE 3
SEARCH STRATEGIES OF THE 1991 UNEMPLOYED JOB-SEEKERS






State employment agency 356 0 0
Public competition 58 118 0
Newspapers 50 85 27
Direct application 42 72 35
Signalling made by relatives/friends 66 116 129
Database 0 4 8
Self-employment 7 3 4
Others 0 2 0
Not reported 19 198 395
TABLE 4
LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS
IN 1993 OF THE 1991 UNEMPLOYED JOB-SEEKERS
Labour market status in 1993 Obs. Percentage
Employed 117 19.57
Unemployed 395 66.05
Unemployment benefits 3 0.50
Occasional work 2 0.33
Not reported 81 13.5518
TABLE 5
HOW 1991 UNEMPLOYED JOB-SEEKERS OBTAINED THEIR 1993 JOB
Methods used Obs. Percentage
State employment agency 5 4.20
Public competition 19 15.97
Newspapers 5 4.20
Direct application 16 13.44




Not reported 5 4.2019
TABLE 6
THE ECONOMIC RETURN FROM THE RECOMMENDATION



























































2 0.3025 0.3091 0.4055
Notes: standard errors are reported in parenthesis under the coefficients.